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EUGENE E. OLWELL et al., Appellants, v. W. L. HOP-
KINS et a1., R.espondents. 
[1] Judgments-Res Judicat~Dismissal.-Ordinarily a judgment 
of dismissal is not a judgment on the merits and therefore does 
not operate as a bar to another action on the same cause of 
action. A dismissal, however, may follow. an actual determina-
tion on the merits. 
[2] ld.-Res Judicata-Dismissal.-Regardless of whether a judg-
ment other than one of dismissal should have been rendered 
in a former action. it was a judgment on the merits so as to 
operate as a bar to another action based on the same facts, 
where the one issue passed on by the trial court in dismissing 
the former action was that raised by the defense that plain-
tiffs' cause of action was based on a void contract. This de-
fense went to the merits of the cause of action. 
[S] ld.-Res Judicata-Judgment on Merits.-A decision on the 
merits which will operate as a bar to another action on the 
same cause of action is not necessarily a decision on the facts; 
and where the trial court in a former action based on the same 
facts had determined that plaintiffs were barred as a matter 
of law from any recovery because the contract on which their 
cause of action depended was void, it was not necessary to 
determine whether, assuming the validity of such contract, 
plaintiffs were entitled to the relief which they sought. 
[4] ld.-Res Judicata-Proof.-In order that a former judgment 
may operate as a bar, evidenne is admissible to identify the 
issues adjUdicated in the former action. 
[5] ld.-Res Judicata-MattersConcluded.-A final judgment on 
the merits between parties who in law are the same operates 
as a bar to '" subsequent action on the same cause of action, 
settling not only every issue that was raised, but also every 
issue that might have been raised in the first action. 
[6] Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Pleading. - Assum-
ing that thp npfpn!<p of re~ judicata should have been raised 
[1] See 15 Cal.Jur. 128; 17 Am.Jur. 95. 
[4] See 15 OalJur. 213; 30 Am.Jur. 998 .. 
[5] See 15 Oa1.Jur. 136: 30 Am.Jur. 912. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2] Judgments, § 353; [3] Judgments, 
§ 350; [4] Judgments, § 445; [5J Judgment!;. § 360; [6] Appeal and 
Error, § 1438; [7] Appeal and Error, § 1523. 
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by answer instead of by demurrer and motion to dismiss, the 
reversal of a judgment of dismissal on that ground would serve 
no useful purpose where the record of the former action made 
it clear that plaintiffs could not overcome that defense. 
[7) Id. - Harmless and Reversible Error - Trial- Special De-
fenses.-Although the defense of res judieata was raised by 
demurrer and motion to dismiss and not by answer, plaintiffi:! 
could not successfully claim on appeal from a judgment of 
dismissal that they were entitled to a trial of that issue under 
Code Civ. Proe., §' 597, relating to trial of special defenses not 
on the merits, where the defense of res judicata was tried at 
the hearing on the motion to dismiss as it would have been 
tried under thE' code section. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Oourt of Santa 
Barbara County. Ernest D. Wagner. Judge. Aftirmed. 
Action to recover real property, for an accounting and 
for damages. Judgment of dismissal after sustaining de-
murrer to complaint without leave to amend, affirmed. 
Norris Montgomery, Heaney, Price, Postel & Parma and 
Francis Price for Appellants. 
Schauer, Ryon & McMahon, Julien F. ~ux and Combs & 
Murphine for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant W. L. Hopkins and Independ-
ent Brokerage Company, a Washington corporation, agreed 
orally in 1927 to carry on joint farming operations in Santa 
Barbara County. The corporation was dissolved in 1936, and 
its business and assets transferred to a partnership composed 
of Eugene E. Olwell and M~rray M. Olwell, the plaintiffs in 
the present action, and Merritt Bloxom. In 1942 the part-
nership transferred its business and assets to plaintiffs. The 
joint farming operations were discontinued in 1937. 
In January. 1941, plaintiffs and their partner brought an 
action against defendants in the Superior Court of Santa 
Barbara County. Defendants filed an answer and there-
after moved to dismiss the action on the ground that since 
Independent Brokerage Company had not qualified to do 
business in California when it entered into the contract upon 
which the action was based, the contract was void under the 
laws then in effect in this state. The motion was heard and both 
parties introduced documentary evidence. Defendants estab-
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Jished that up to December 1, 1942, the corporation had not 
qualified to do business in this state. The court dismissed 
the action without making any findings or conclusions of 
law, and its judgment became final. 
The present action was begun in January, 1943, upon the 
same cause of action. In their complaint plaintiffs pleaded 
the contract entered into by defendant W. L. Hopkins and 
Independent Brokerage Company, alieged that defendant 
W. L. Hopkins fraudulently concealed certain facts con-
nected with the joint operations under that contract and 
prayed that defendants be declared constructive trustees 
of certain real property for plaintiffs. They also sought 
an accounting and damages. The complaint took note of 
the filing and dismissal of the former action. The trial 
court sustained defendants' demurrer to the complaint with-
out leave to amend and granted their motion to dismiss 
the action on grounds that it was barred by the former 
judgment and that the contract upon which plaintiffs' cause 
of action depended was void. Plaintiffs appeal. 
Plaintiffs contend that defendants' motion to dismiss the 
former action amounted to a mere plea in abatement and that 
the judgment rendered upon that plea was therefore not on 
the merits and cannot be res judicata in the present action. 
[1] Ordinarily a judgment of dismissal is not a judgment 
on the merits and therefore does not operate as a bar to an-
other action on the same cause of action. This court has rec-
ognized, however, that a dismissal may follow an actual deter-
mination on the merits (Goddard v. Security Title Ins. ~ 
Guar. Co., 14 Cal.2d 47, 53 [92 P.2d 804]; see Campanella v. 
Campanella, 204 Cal. 515, 520 [269 P. 433]; Oakland v. Oak-
land Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160, 223 [50 P. 277]; Moch 
v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.App. 471, 475 [179 P. 440]; Sau.l 
v. J/oscone, 16 Cal.App. 506. 510 [118 P. 452]) as have courts 
in other jurisdictions. (See cases cited in 2 Freeman on Judg-
ments (5th ed.) § 752.) In 'A[och v. Superior Court, mpra, 
the court said at page 475: "In considering .•• whether or 
not this judgment was an adjudication of the merits of the 
controversy, . ~ . the word 'dismissed' is not determinative. 
The cases are not rare wherein judgments or orders purport-
ing to be merely 'dismissals' have been held to be final adjudi-
cations upon the merits. This question is to be determined. 
not on the basis of any single word or phrase used, but llpOJl 
a consideration of the entire 'judgment,' together with the 
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pleading:-:; and the findings ...... In "AfdIic7ccns v. McMick- , 
ens, 220 Cal. i31, 73·1 1.32 P.2d 3!}iJ. ~on~ideratioll of the 
merits of the plaintiff's position was held to be foreclosed by 
the "judgment of dismissal" entered in a former action. The 
dismissal in that case may be distinguishable on the ground 
that it was entered upon the sustaining of a general demurrer 
without leave to amend. but the case nonetheless illustrates 
the fact that a judgment is not precluded from being a bar 
to a subsequent nction merely because it is one of dismissal. 
Plaintiffs contend that the· Code of Civil Procedure does not 
provide for the dismissal of actions decided upon the merits. 
The question is not, however, l\'hether the trial court should 
have rendered a judgment other t.han of dismissal in the 
former action, but whether the judgment that it rendered 
was on the merits. An inquiry must therefore be made in the 
present case into the groundR supporting the judgment of 
dismiRRal in the former action. 
[2] At the hearing upon their motion to dismiss the pres-
ent action, defendants introduced in evidence the record of 
the first action. It is clear from that record that the one 
issue pas..c;ed upon by the trial court in dismissing the first 
action was that raised by defendantR' contention that plain-
tiffs' cause of action was based upon a contract that was void. 
The defense t.hus interposed went to the merits of plaintiffs' 
cause of action. Defendants did not merely contend that 
plllintiffs had no capacity to sue or that they had started their 
action prematurely or in the wrong court or that that par-
ticular action was barred on account of some other technical 
defect. (See 15 Ca1..1ur ..• Tudgments. § 183: Rest., Judg-
ments. § 49.) They raised an issue as to plaintiffs' right to 
recover under an~T circumstance!" upon their alleged caU!'ie 
of action and upon that iRsue the court rendered judg-
ment a.gainst plaintiffs. [3] Plaintiffs point out that the 
trial judge stated in hi!; memorandum opinion that the 
issue raised by defendants should be decided "before a 
trial is had upon the facts." A decision on the merits, 
however, is not necessarily a decision upon the facts. It 
is true that the court did not determine whether, assum-
ing the validity of the contract relied upon by plaintiffs, 
they were entitled to damages, to an accounting, or to a 
declaration that defendants held certain property as con-
structh-e trustees. Such determination, howeyer, was U11-
llece8sary since t.he court had just determined t.hat plaintiffs 
were barred as a matter of law from any recovery. 
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In Maryland O. 00. v. 8uperior Court, 91 Cal.App. 356 
[267 P. 169], upon which plaintiffs rely, a writ of mandate 
was sought to force the dismissal by the superior court of 
an action brought upon a contract alleged to be void on the 
ground that the plaintiff corporation had not paid its license 
and franchise taxes. In denying the writ the court stated 
at page 359: "No reason exists why an action should be dis-
missed instead of being decided upon its merits because the 
claim sued upon is founded upon a void contract." In the 
present case, however, the dismissal occurred after and not 
in lieu of a determination on the merits. In Home Owners' 
Loan Oorp. v. Gordon. 36 Cal.App.2d 189, 192 [97 P.2d 845], 
the defense that the plaintiff corporation had not qualified to 
do business in this state was said to be a defense in abate-
ment. In the present case, however, the contention that plain-
tiffs failed to comply with certain statutory provisions is 
raised not merely as a challenge to their right to sue in this 
state, an obvious defense in abatement, but as a challenge to 
the validity of the contract upon which they rely. 
Plaintiffs contend that in the absence of findings, the former 
judgment alone may be resorted to for a determination of the 
issues concluded by that judgment and that, since it purports 
merely to dismiss the action without giving any grounds 
for such dismissal, it cannot be res judicata upon any 
issue of law or fact because a judgment must be held not 
to have been rendered on the merits when the grounds upon 
which it was rendered do not appear on its face. [4] It is 
settled, however, that evidence is admissible to identify the 
issues adjudicated in a former action. (Russell v. Place, 94 
U.S. 606, 608 [24 L.Ed. 214]; Graves v. Hebbron, 125 Cal. 
400, 406 [58 P. 12]; Gray v. Dougherty, 25 Cal. 266, 272; 
Johnston v. -Ota, 43 Cal.App.2d 94, 97 [110 P.2d -507];----.-·-.-
Goodman v. Dam, 112 'Cal.App. 244, 246 [296 P. 623]; see 
30 Am.Jur. 998.) McDuff v. McDuff, 45 CaLApp. 53 [187 
P. 37], upon which plaintiffs rely, is distinguishable. The 
cause of action sued upon in that case was not the same 
as that upon which the judgment alleged to be res judi-
cata had been rendered, so that the judgment was conclu-
sive only as to the issues actually raised and determined in 
the former action. (See 15 Cal.Jur., Judgments, § 189.) 
Since the record in that suit failed to disclose the ground 
Upon which the judgment was based, that judgment was 
held not to conclude any issue raised in the second action. 
) 
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[6] A final judgment on the merits between parties who 
in law are the same operates as a bar to a subsequent action 
upon the same cause of action, settling not only every issue 
that was raised, but also every issue that might have been 
raised in the first action. (Dobbins v. Title Guar. & Trust 00., 
22 Cal.2d 64, 70 [136 P.2d 572]; Panos v. Great Western 
Packing 00., 21 Ca1.2d 636, 638 [134 P.2d 242), and cases 
cited therein; see 15 Cal.Jur., Judgments, § 189; 30 Am.Jur. 
912; Rest., Judgments, § 63.) Thus, the former judgment 
being res judicata in the present action, plaintiffs' conten-
tion that their cause of action depend..'1 not upon any con·· 
tract, but on the alleged fraudulent acquisition of their prop-
erty by defendants cannot be considered. Since "an erro-
neous judgment is as conclusive as a correct one" (Panos v. 
Great Western Packing 00., 8'Upra, at p. 640), plaintiffs 
should have appealed from the former judgment, if in their 
opinion the court rendering that judgment misunderstood 
their cause of action or otherwise erroneously denied them 
recovery. Their contention that the doctrine of election of 
remedies would not prevent them from recovering in the 
present action is immaterial. for defendants do not rely on 
that doctrine but on that of res judicata. 
[6] Plaintiffs contend that the defense of res judicata 
cannot be raised on demurrer in the present action on the 
ground that the facts alleged in the complaint are not suffi-
cient to support that defense. The complaint discloses the 
number and title of the former action and that it was brought 
against the same defendant!': and in the same court as the 
present action; that defendants answered plaintiffs' second 
amended complaint and subsequently moved to dismiss the 
action while plaintiffs moved for leave to file a third amended 
complaint; and that the court granted the motion of defend-
ant.."l and denied that of plaintiffs. There is no need to de-
termine whether the demurrer can be sustained on the ground' 
that the record of tHe former action was incorporated into the 
complaint by the reference to the title and number of that 
action, or that the court's refusal to allow plaintiffs to file a 
third amended complaint is consistent only with the conclu-
sion that defendants had presented such an absolute defense 
on the merits that no amendment could possibly improve 
plaintiffs' position. Assuming that defendants should have 
raised the defense of res judicata by answer instead of bJ 
demurrer and motion to dismiss, the fact remains that to re-
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verse the judgment on that ground would serve no useful 
purpose, since the record of the former action makes it 
clear that plaintifff' cannot overcome that defense. 
[7] Plaintiffs contend that under section 597 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure they were entitled to a trial of the issue 
of res judicata. That section provides: "When the answer 
plead!> that the action if:: barred ••• by a prior judgment, 
. . . or ijets up any other defense not involving the merits of 
the plaintiffs cause of action but constituting a bar or ground 
of abatement to the prosecution thereof, the court may, upon 
the motion of either party, proceed to the trial of such special 
defense . . . before the trial of any other issue in the case, 
and if the decision . . . upon any special defense so tried . . 
is in favor of the defendant pleading the same, judgment for 
such defendant shall thereupon be entered and no trial of 
other issues in the action shall be had. . . ." Although the 
defense of res judicata in the present action was raised by 
demurrer and motion to dismiss and not by answer, it was 
tried at the hearing upon that motion as it would have been 
tried under the provisions of section 597. The evidence at a 
trial under that section would be the record of the former 
action, which was introduced at the hearing upon defendants' 
motion to dismiss, and since that trial would take place "be-
fore the trial of any other issue," plaintiffs would find them-
selves in exactly the same position as they are now. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J .. Carter, J .. and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
Schauer, .} .. did DOt l>a.rticipate. 
